Disloyal Computer Use and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Narrowing the Scope by Pollaro, Greg
DISLOYAL COMPUTER USE AND THE 
COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT: 




Congress drafted the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 
to protect government interest computers from malicious attacks by 
hackers.  As computer use has expanded in the years since its 
enactment, the CFAA has similarly expanded to cover a number of 
computer-related activities.  This iBrief discusses the extension of 
the CFAA into the employer/employee context, suggests that this 
goes beyond the Act's express purpose, compares the different 
approaches taken by the circuit courts in applying the CFAA to 
disloyal computer use by employees, and argues that the more 
recent approach taken by the Ninth Circuit provides a better model 
for determining if and when the CFAA should apply to employees.  
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Disgruntled employees beware.  Those who exit their former 
employment with photocopies of client lists or company financial 
information have traditionally been susceptible to breach of contract, 
fiduciary duty, and trade secrets suits in state court.  More recently, those 
who use a computer to email or otherwise obtain digital copies of such 
information have found themselves susceptible to civil, and possibly 
criminal, sanctions in federal court under the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (CFAA).  Initially crafted in the 1980s to impede remote computer 
hacking, the CFAA opened the door to the federal courts for plaintiffs 
seeking an easier path to combat employee misconduct based on an 
employee's “unauthorized access” to a company computer.   
¶2 The Seventh Circuit in International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. 
Citrin held that access is unauthorized for the purposes of the CFAA when 
an employee decides to act contrary to his employer's interest.2  Applying 
principles of agency law, the court waded into muddy waters by allowing 
the mental state of the employee to determine authorization. However, a 
recent opinion from the Ninth Circuit in LVRC Holdings, L.L.C. v. Brekka3
                                                     
1 J.D. candidate at Duke University School of Law, Class of 2011; B.A. 
Journalism 2005, Northern Kentucky University. 
 
2 440 F. 3d 418, 420-21 (2006). 
3 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 20439 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 2009). 
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rejected the Seventh Circuit’s approach and held that authorization is 
granted by the employer and, therefore, that authorization ends when the 
employer rescinds it.4
¶3 This iBrief explores the evolution of litigation under the CFAA to 
include actions by employers against employees who use a computer to 
misappropriate, misuse or damage information belonging to the employer.  
Part I discusses the creation and subsequent amendment of the CFAA from 
a narrow tool for protecting federal interests against new crimes unique to 
computer use to a broad method for bringing traditional state law claims 
into federal court.  Part II analyzes the split in authority between the 
Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit regarding what constitutes authorized 
access in the context of the CFAA.  Part III concludes that the CFAA was 
not designed to apply to employer/employee claims that are traditionally 
handled under state tort and contract law.  Consequently, courts faced with 
similar suits should allow CFAA suits to proceed only when the computer 
use was integral, rather than incidental, to the underlying claim.  In the 
alternative, courts should follow the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Brekka and 
narrowly apply the CFAA to those situations in which authorized computer 
access has not been granted or has been rescinded by the employer. 
  This split in authority raises questions about how 
broadly or narrowly the CFAA should be applied—or whether it should be 
applied at all—in the context of an employee’s disloyal computer use. 
I. COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT: EXPANDING THE NET 
¶4 The 1983 film War Games starred Matthew Broderick as a 
computer whiz kid who unwittingly uses his home computer to hack into 
NORAD's computer system.  Broderick’s chicanery brought the United 
States to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union.5  War Games 
introduced much of the country to the “hacker,” and its influence was not 
lost on members of Congress, who already were trying to decide what to do 
about traditional property laws that were ill-equipped to deal with network 
trespassers and intangible property that “may exist only in the form of 
magnetic impulses.”6  Recognizing that many states already had their own 
computer crime laws, Congress stepped in gingerly with the Counterfeit 
Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 (1984 Act).7
¶5 The 1984 Act proscribed three specific types of activity: 
 
                                                     
4 Id. at *15. 
5 WAR GAMES (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1983). 
6 H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 
3695.  “The motion picture War Games showed a realistic representation of the 
automatic dialing and access capabilities of the personal computer.”  Id. at 3696. 
7 Dodd S. Griffith, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured 
Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453, 459 (1990). 
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• knowingly accessing a computer without authorization or 
exceeding authorization to obtain classified information with 
intent or belief that such information would be used to harm 
the United States; 
• knowingly accessing a computer without authorization or 
exceeding authorization to obtain financial or credit records 
from a financial institution; and 
• knowingly accessing a computer used by or on behalf of the 
United States if such access interferes with the government's 
use of the computer.8
¶6 Penalties included fines and imprisonment for up to ten years for 
first offenses, twenty years for repeat offenses.
  
9  Operating with little data 
illuminating the nature and extent of the problem posed by computer crime 
at the time, “the 1984 Act essentially was a shot in the dark.”10
¶7 Responding to criticisms and calls from the Department of Justice 
to clarify and greatly expand the 1984 Act to cover a wider range of 
activities, Congress adopted the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 
(1986 Act).
   
11
The Committee . . . prefers instead to limit Federal jurisdiction over 
computer crime to those cases in which there is a compelling Federal 
interest, i.e., where computers of the Federal Government or certain 
financial institutions are involved, or where the crime itself is 
interstate in nature.  The Committee is convinced that this approach 
strikes the appropriate balance between the Federal Government's 
interest in computer crime and the interests and abilities of the States 
to proscribe and punish such offenses.
  Rather than create a broad preemptive statute, as some critics 
suggested, legislators exercised caution and showed their continued 
commitment to allow states to implement their own computer crime laws: 
12
The 1986 Act expanded the number of proscribed acts to include use of a 
computer to steal property in an attempt to defraud; use of a computer to 
intentionally alter or damage data in a federal interest computer; and the 
trafficking of computer passwords.
 
13
                                                     
8 Id. at 460. 
   
9 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-473, ch. 21, 98 
Stat. 2190 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008)) 
10 Griffith, supra note 7, at 483. 
11 Id. at 473. 
12 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2482. 
13 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, at 2 (2007), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ccmanual/. 
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¶8 Subsequent amendments followed in 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994, 1996, 
2001, 2002, and 2008 as Congress attempted to keep pace with changes in 
computer technology and use.14  Most notable among these are the 1994 and 
1996 amendments.  In 1994, Congress added a private cause of action15 that 
would ultimately open the door to the types of employer/employee disputes 
discussed below. In 1996, the phrase “federal interest computer” was 
replaced with “protected computer.”16  “Protected computer” is defined as 
one that is used by the United States Government or a financial institution; 
or one that is used in interstate commerce or communication.17  These 
amendments, in particular, broadened the scope of the CFAA far beyond its 
original intent, and much of the careful consideration and debate undertaken 
a decade earlier about the proper role of the federal government was 
absent.18  The inclusion of all computers used in interstate communication 
had a profound effect, intentionally or otherwise, as any computer 
connected to the Internet could be considered a “protected computer” under 
the CFAA.19
¶9 The seven types of activity covered by the current CFAA can be 
summarized as follows: 
   
1. obtaining national security information; 
2. compromising the confidentiality of a computer; 
3. trespassing in a Government computer; 
4. accessing a computer to defraud and obtain value; 
5. transmission or access that causes damage; 
6. trafficking in passwords; and 
7. extortion involving threats to damage computer20
                                                     
14 See id. at 2. 
 
15 H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at sec. 290001 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839. 
16 S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 10 (1996). 
17 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (2006). 
18 See Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 914-15 (2003). 
19 See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 
2d 1121, 1127 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (“[T]he original version of the CFAA did not 
intend to enact sweeping federal jurisdiction.  However, the CFAA was intended 
to control interstate computer crime, and since the advent of the Internet, almost 
all computer use has become interstate in nature.”). 
20 Prosecuting Computer Crimes, supra note 13, at 2. 
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Operating “without authorization” or “exceeding authorized access” is a 
key element in the first five offenses.21  “Exceeding authorized access” is 
defined as “access[ing] a computer with authorization and us[ing] such 
access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is 
not entitle so to obtain or alter.”22  “Without authorization” is not defined 
in the text of the statute, and this, in conjunction with the “protected 
computer” language, has led to a series of civil suits in which courts have 
wrestled with how to define “without authorization.”23
 
  In a larger 
context, this is a question of how broadly the CFAA should be applied.   
¶10 Congress decided early in the CFAA’s history that it wanted a 
single statute to cover the field of computer crime “rather than identifying 
and amending every potentially applicable statute affected by advances in 
computer technology.”24  The price for this legislative expediency is that 
one relatively brief statute is applied to a range of disparate activities such 
as fraud, trespass, spam, phishing, worms, viruses and denial of service 
attacks.25  This has inevitably forced square pegs into round holes.  One 
area in which the courts’ struggles have been particularly noticeable is in 
civil suits brought by employers against former employees who are accused 
of misappropriating or misusing information while they were still 
employed.26
II. EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT UNDER THE CFAA 
 
¶11 An employee, having decided to leave her current employer for 
greener pastures, emails confidential files from her work computer to her 
personal email account.  She then leaves her job to join a competitor and 
discloses the confidential information to her new employer.27
                                                     
21 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a). 
  Undoubtedly 
her actions were wrong and could subject her to a number of claims under 
state law such as tortious interference and misappropriation of trade 
22 Id. § 1030(e)(6). 
23 See, e.g., Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962 (D. Ariz. 2008) 
(holding that computer access is “without authorization” only when initial 
access is not permitted). 
24 S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 5 (1996). 
25 See, e.g., America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E. D. Va. 
1998) (holding that defendants violated the CFAA by using AOL access to send 
bulk emails to AOL members). 
26 See, e.g., US Bioservices Corp. v. Lugo, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Kan. 2009) 
(granting defendants' motion to dismiss CFAA claim because access to 
confidential information was authorized during the term of employment). 
27 See id. 
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secrets,28 but do they run afoul of the CFAA?  Assuming the plaintiff can 
show damage or loss of the statutory minimum $5,000,29
A. International Airport Centers v. Citrin: Authorization and Agency 
 the answer turns 
on how the court defines “without authorization.”  There is a split of 
authority between the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, the only 
appellate courts to have ruled on this issue.  The Seventh Circuit held that 
the above facts presented a valid CFAA claim, while the Ninth Circuit held 
the opposite.  The core difference between these two rulings was the 
circuits’ interpretation of the phrase “without authorization.” 
¶12 In 2006, the Seventh Circuit was the first appellate court to wade 
into the “without authorization” debate that had been ongoing among the 
district courts for more than five years.30  In International Airport Centers, 
L.L.C. v. Citrin, the defendant, was employed by the plaintiff to look for 
and help acquire real estate.31  Citrin decided to quit working for 
International Airport Centers (IAC) and start his own business.32  Prior to 
leaving IAC, Citrin erased all the data on a laptop computer provided by 
IAC, some of which would have shown he had engaged in improper 
conduct and none of which IAC had any additional copies.33  Citrin 
installed and used a secure-erase program to do this, which meant that the 
data were truly unrecoverable.34  IAC sued under the CFAA's civil 
provision, § 1030(g), claiming Citrin had violated § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), which 
provides that such violation occurs when one “knowingly causes the 
transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result 
of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a 
protected computer.”35
¶13 The court, citing congressional intent that the CFAA should reach 
internal as well as external actors, readily settled on a broad definition of 
what constitutes a transmission.
   
36
                                                     
28 See id. (denying defendants' motion to dismiss trade secrets and tortious 
interference claims). 
  While not quite holding that pressing the 
delete key constitutes a transmission, the court nevertheless determined that 
installing the secure-erase program—whether installed remotely or by an 
29 18 U.S.C. §1030(c)(4)(i)(I) (2006). 
30 See, e.g., Shurgard, supra note 19 (applying agency law to determine that 
defendant's authorization ended when he chose to act contrary to employer's 
interests). 
31 440 F. 3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2006). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id.  
35 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (2006). 
36 See Citrin, 440 F. 3d 418, at 419-20. 
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actor with direct physical access—constituted a transmission in accordance 
with the CFAA.37
¶14 The court next turned to the authorization element of § 1030(a)(5).  
Here, the court applied principles of agency law and determined that Citrin's 
authorization to access the laptop computer ended at the moment he 
violated his employment contract by deciding to act contrary to IAC's 
interests, i.e., before he erased the data on the computer's hard drive.
   
38  That 
authorization, the court said, was granted through the agency relationship 
Citrin had with his employer and implicitly ended when he violated his duty 
of loyalty to that employer.39
¶15 This application of agency law to the CFAA was not a novel 
concept, as it mirrored an earlier district court decision in Shurgard Storage 
Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc.
   
40  There, a rival storage 
company hired some of plaintiff's employees, who, before leaving their old 
positions, emailed confidential information about their former employer’s 
business.41  Shurgard sued, claiming three CFAA violations.42  The 
defendants, seeking a dismissal for failure to state a claim, argued that 
CFAA provisions requiring that they act without authorization did not apply 
because they were, in the scope of their employment with plaintiff, 
authorized to access the information that they passed to their future 
employer.43
Unless otherwise agreed, the authority of an agent terminates if 
without knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse interest or if 
he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal.
  Plaintiff raised the agency argument based on § 112 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency: 
44





   
                                                     
37 See id. at 419. It should be noted that some computer operating systems, such 
as the widely-popular Mac OS X, contain their own secure-erase functions.  
Using the court's logic, then, someone who installs such an operating system and 
uses it to erase data on the computer without authorization could be guilty of 
violating the CFAA. Dan E. Lawrence, Just Add Plaintiff: The Seventh Circuit's 
Recipe for Instant Liability Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 46 
WASHBURN L.J. 223, 240 (2006). 
38 Citrin, 440 F. 3d at 420-21. 
39 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958). 
40 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
41 Id. at 1123. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1124. 
44 Id. at 1125 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY). 
45 Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1125. 
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¶16 Inherent in both Citrin and Shurgard is the policy judgment made 
by each court that these kinds of employer–employee claims should, or at 
least can, be handled under the CFAA.  Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit 
did not spend much time discussing the law’s legislative history other than 
to make conclusory remarks regarding Congress’s concern with protecting 
against direct, internal attacks as well as external attacks.46 The defendants 
in Shurgard, however, directly raised the policy question, and the court 
discussed at some length the language it finds in the legislative history 
supporting a narrow, and conversely, a broad interpretation of the intent 
behind the CFAA.47  The court ultimately found language in the record that 
convinced it that the CFAA, at least since the time of the 1996 amendment, 
was meant to cover the present facts.48
[I]ndividuals who intentionally break into, or abuse their authority to 
use, a computer and thereby obtain information of minimal value of 
$5,000 or less, would be subject to a misdemeanor penalty.  The crime 
becomes a felony if the offense was committed for purposes of 
commercial advantage or private financial gain, for the purposes of 
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation . . . of the laws of 




The Shurgard court ultimately found the statutory language to be 




B. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka: Active Authorization 
 
¶17 The CFAA authorization issue resurfaced at the appellate level in 
2009, this time in the Ninth Circuit in LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka.51
                                                     
46 Citrin, 440 F. 3d 418, at 420. 
  
Brekka was hired by LVRC to oversee Internet marketing for its residential 
treatment facility.  At the time, Brekka owned and operated two consulting 
companies that referred potential clients to rehabilitation facilities.  Brekka 
was given administrative access to information related to LVRC's business 
including a financial statement and patient admission reports.  Brekka 
emailed some of these documents and others he created for his work at 
LVRC to his personal computer.  When ownership negotiations between 
Brekka and LVRC broke down, Brekka left the company, which 
47 See Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1127-28. 
48 Id. at 1128. 
49 Id. at 1128-29 (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7-8 (1996)). 
50 Id. at 1129. 
51 581 F. 3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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subsequently sued, claiming that Brekka violated the CFAA when he 
emailed company records to further his own interests.52
¶18 LVRC argued the agency theory of authorization endorsed in Citrin 
by saying Brekka’s authorization to access the confidential files ended when 
he began acting contrary to LVRC's interests.
   
53  The court held that the text 
of the CFAA provided no definition of “authorization,” so the court turned 
next to its common usage.  “[I]t is a fundamental canon of statutory 
construction . . . that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as 
taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”54  For this, the 
court turned to a straightforward dictionary definition of “authorization” as 
“permission or power granted by an authority.”55  The court found no 
language in the CFAA that either contradicted this straightforward 
definition or supported LVRC’s agency-based definition.56  The former 
definition can be understood as active authorization, while the latter might 
be considered passive authorization.  Active authorization is granted by one 
to another and ends when and where the authority chooses.  In the present 
case, then, Brekka’s authorization persisted until LVRC terminated his 
employment or revoked his permission to access the company's files.57  
Passive authorization, in contrast, is received and disappears when the 
authorized person has a change in purpose, e.g., when one chooses to act 
contrary to the authority’s interest.  The Brekka court expressly rejected 
Citrin and this latter definition in the CFAA context because it would lead 
to less clarity and notice to potential offenders, particularly when the 
conduct is subject to criminal penalties.58  “The Supreme Court has long 
warned against interpreting criminal statutes in surprising and novel ways 
that impose unexpected burdens on defendants.”59
¶19 Consequently, the court held that the CFAA is not applicable to 
factual situations such as these, where authorization to access the 
information in question was clearly granted and not clearly revoked.
 
60
                                                     
52 Id. at 1129-30. 
  
Instead, it implied that the provisions of the statute containing the 
authorization element should be applied to a narrower range of cases “when 
the person has not received permission to use the computer for any purpose 
(such as when a hacker accesses someone's computer without any 
53 See id. at 1132. 
54 Id. (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
55 Id. at 1133 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 139 (2001) 
(emphasis added). 
56 Id. at 1133. 
57 See id. at 1135. 
58 Id. at 1134-35. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 1135. 
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permission), or when the employer has rescinded permission to access the 
computer and the defendant uses the computer anyway.”61
III. RESTORING SOME BALANCE 
 
¶20 Whether the Supreme Court ultimately determines how to define 
“authorization” under the CFAA or Congress undertakes this on its own, the 
implications of the ultimate decision will be far reaching.   
¶21 A broad definition as in Shurgard and Citrin opens the federal 
courthouse to a number of scenarios not intended by the legislators who 
crafted the CFAA.62  Plaintiffs would like to have this choice of venue open 
to them because it provides them with strategic advantages, such as a 
shorter wait for a trial date and less limitations on discovery.63
¶22 While allowing access to federal court in these kinds of cases is not 
problematic per se, two additional considerations weigh against adopting 
the Citrin view.  First, there is the issue of clarity and notice raised by the 
court in Brekka.  Under the broad, agency definition, employees could be 
subject to penalties under the CFAA if their employers can claim that their 
authorization was revoked because they did something believed to be 
contrary to the employers’ interests.  Second, scenarios exist in which the 
Citrin definition lowers the evidentiary bar for plaintiffs.  Trade secret 
litigation is one example, where the traditional burden of showing that the 
information provides a competitive advantage and was kept in secrecy is 
nonexistent in the CFAA, and plaintiffs must show only that the 
information was taken from a protected computer and that they suffered the 
requisite damage or loss.
  
Additionally, supplemental jurisdiction would allow plaintiffs to have any 
purely state law claims attached to the facts of their CFAA claim to be tried 
in federal court. 
64
¶23 A narrow definition, on the other hand, has the dual benefit of 
providing a clearer standard and being in accord with the initial spirit and 
purpose of the CFAA.  While it would preclude cases such as Shurgard, 
Citrin, and Brekka from getting into federal court, each would be able to 
proceed under various state law claims.  For scenarios in which the use of a 
computer is incidental, rather than integral, to the offense it would seem that 
  It is difficult to imagine that Congress intended 
the CFAA to short-circuit state law in this way. 
                                                     
61 See id. at 1135. 
62 See, e.g., United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009) 
(overturning a lower court CFAA conviction based on violations of a website 
terms of service agreement). 
63 Stephen R. Buckingham, Court Gives New Use to 1994 Law: Trade Secrets, 
NAT’L L.J., Feb. 5, 2001. 
64 Id. 
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requiring such claims to go forward in state court is in accordance with 
finding “the appropriate balance between the Federal Government’s interest 
in computer crime and the interests and abilities of the States to proscribe 
and punish such offenses.”65
CONCLUSION 
   
¶24 The CFAA has broken free of its moorings as a criminal statute 
primarily aimed at penalizing the malicious computer hacking of 
government interest computers.  The definition of a computer protected 
under the Act dramatically expanded to include any computer used in 
interstate commerce or communication, i.e., any computer connected to the 
Internet.  Opportunistic plaintiffs have until recently found the federal 
courts amenable to its use in civil suits against disloyal employees.  The 
Supreme Court ultimately may determine whether Brekka marks a return to 
a more limited application of the CFAA in line with its original purpose.  In 
the interim, Brekka at a minimum provides a clearer, more workable 
standard by which to determine the Act's applicability to the employer–
employee context. 
 
                                                     
65 S. REP. NO. 99-432, supra note 9, at 4. 
